type physicalism造句

• Unlike token physicalism, type physicalism entails supervenience physicalism.
• One version of reductive physicalism is type physicalism or mind-body identity theory.
• Thus, Perry defends a version of type physicalism against three major philosophical arguments for modal argument.
• Type physicalism asserts that " for every actually instantiated property F, there is some physical property G such that F = G ".
• Then see also the arguments from various sides in Type physicalism .-- Talk 22 : 40, 22 October 2006 ( UTC)
• Type physicalism is contrasted by token identity physicalism, which argues that mental events are unlikely to have " steady " or categorical biological correlates.
• There are other ways a physicalist might criticize type physicalism; eliminative materialism and revisionary materialism question whether science is currently using the best categorisations.
• Type physicalism can now be understood to argue that there is identicalness between types, whereas token identity physicalism says one can only describe a particular, unique, brain event.
• Type physicalism ( or type-identity theory ) was developed by John Smart [ 17 ] and Ullin Place [ 42 ] as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism.
• If we answer " yes " ( as Jackson suggests we do ) to this question, then we have supposedly denied the truth of type physicalism, for if Mary has exhausted all the physical facts about experiencing colour prior to her release, then her subsequently acquiring some new piece of information about colour upon experiencing its quale reveals that there must be something about the experience of colour which is not captured by the physicalist picture . ( See Mary's room page for full discussion ).
• On this understanding, "'type physicalism "'can be seen as incompatible with functionalism, since it claims that what characterizes mental states ( e . g . pain ) is that they are physical in nature, while functionalism says that what characterizes pain is its functional / causal role and its relationship with yelling " ouch ", etc . However, any weaker sort of physicalism which makes the simple ontological claim that everything that exists is made up of physical matter is perfectly compatible with functionalism.